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COMMONWEALTH v. BOSURGI AND COMMONWEALTH
v. COCKFIELD: UNREASONABLE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE, VARIATIONS ON A THEME
The decision of Mapp v. Ohio,' called a "hurricane ' 2 and "the most
significant event in criminal law since the adoption of the fourteenth amendment,"'3 requires state courts to exclude evidence obtained by "unreasonable
searches and seizures."'4 Prior to the Mapp case a motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence was an "expensive futility" 5 in Pennsylvania because the
Commonwealth subscribed to the non-exclusionary rule.6 Since Mapp a
motion to suppress evidence has been a vortex of confusion for Pennsylvania's
lower courts. 7 In two recent cases, Commonwealth v. Bosurgi8 and Commonwealth v. Cockfield,9 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania surveyed the debris
of hurricane Mapp. The court ostensibly held that the state courts can determine what constitutes an unreasonable search and seizure on an appeal from
an order to suppress evidence. The court also attempted to construct guidelines for the determination. This Recent Case will examine the rationale
underlying both of these decisions with a consideration of federal law pertaining to search and seizure; persuasive practical considerations influencing
the court's decisions will be noted. Special attention will also be directed to
the test of reasonableness applicable to search and seizure.
Bosurgi's indictment charged burglary, larceny, and receiving stolen
goods. Prior to trial his counsel filed a motion to suppress certain evidence
1. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
2. Commonwealth v. One 1955 Buick Sedan, 198 Pa. Super. 133, 135, 182 A.2d
295 (1962).
3. Specter, Mapp v. Ohio: Pandora's Problems for the Prosecutor, 111 U. PA. L.
REv. 4 (1962). For an analysis of the problems created by Mapp see 75 HARV. L. REV.
152-60 (1961).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
thing to be seized."
5. Brief for Appellee, p. 3, Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, 411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304
(1963).
6. E.g., Commonwealth v. Dabbierio, 290 Pa. 174, 138 At. 679 (1927) ; Com-

monwealth v. Grasse, 80 Pa. Super. 480 (1923); Commonwealth v. Finch, 80 Pa.
Super.
7.
8.
9.

386 (1923).
Specter, supra note 3, at 5.
411 Pa. 56, 190 A.2d 304 (1963).
411 Pa. 71, 190 A.2d 898 (1963).
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allegedly obtained by unreasonable search and seizure. The Court of Quarter
Sessions of Philadelphia County granted the motion. The superior court
reversed and the supreme court granted allocatur.10 In holding that the
Commonwealth may appeal an order to suppress evidence, the Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania rejected appellant's argument that Pennsylvania should adopt
the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court in Dibello v. United
States." That case held that the prosecution could not appeal preindictment
orders to suppress evidence. 12 Justice Jones, writing for the majority in the
Bosurgi case, noted that the Mapp decision did not require state courts to
13
follow federal procedural requirements in carrying out the exclusionary rule.
Prior Pennsylvania decisions have allowed the Commonwealth to appeal
rulings in criminal cases in certain situations: where the appeal involves a
question of law,' 4 where the order is definitive in nature, 15 or where the
order would terminate the prosecution.' 6 Since in Bosurgi a suppression of
evidence would have terminated the prosecution, 17 the court could have relied
on the rationale of Commonwealth v. Richards.'8 Rather, the court chose to
elaborate on the right of appeal from an order suppressing evidence and indicated that such an order was appealable by the Commonwealth even if it
did not terminate the prosecution. 19 This expansion of the Richards rule
rested on the rationale that "without a right of appeal in the Commonwealth
.. .the Commonwealth is deprived of any opportunity to secure appellate
court valuation of the order of suppression which forces the Commonwealth
to trial without all its evidence."' 20 While this rule may be criticized as depriving the accused of his right to a speedy trial and as an unwarranted ex10. Supra note 8, at 60, 190 A.2d at 307.
11. 369 U.S. 121 (1962).
12. Ibid. The rationale underlying this decision may be that the United States is
not prejudiced by a pre-indictment order suppressing evidence anymore than by an adverse ruling on evidence during trial. Supra note 8, at 61 n.5, 190 A.2d at 307 n.5
(dictum). However, one should not lose sight of the fact that statutory authority has
been given to the Government to appeal from interlocutory judgments in other circumstances, and Congress had declined an opportunity to give such authority for an appeal
from a pre-indictment order to suppress. The Court may have believed that this indicated congressional disapproval or that Congress was the one to decide whether the

Government could appeal. See Annot., 156 A.L.R. 1207 (1945).
13. Mapp v. Ohio, supra note 1, at 659 n.9.
14. Commonwealth v. Melton, 402 Pa. 628, 629, 168 A.2d 328 (1961).
15. Commonwealth v. Rich, 174 Pa. Super. 174, 100 A.2d 144 (1953).
16. Commonwealth v. Richards, 198 Pa. Super. 39, 42, 182 A.2d 291, 293 (1962).
See Specter, supra note 3, at 34.
17. Supra note 8, at 61, 190 A.2d at 307.
18. Supra note 16, at 42, 182 A.2d at 293.
19. Supra note 17, at 62-64, 190 A.2d at 308 (dictum). This dictum foreshadowed
the holding in Commonwealth v. Wright, 411 Pa. 81, 190 A.2d 709, 710 (1963) and
Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra note 9.
20. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8, at 63, 190 A.2d at 308. (Emphasis
added.)
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tension of the "finality" concept in appellate review, 21 the rule does have decided practical advantages in light of the Mapp case. This holding will bring
search and seizure issues before the superior court and supreme court
sooner and allow them to clarify the law in the area. Subsequent cases, Commonwealth v. Wright2 2 and Commonwealth v. Cockfield, 23 settled the rule
24
that the Commonwealth may appeal a pretrial order to suppress evidence.
In passing on the validity of the lower court's order to suppress evidence
the court in Bosurgi had to determine if the following search violated the
fourth amendment. On July 10, 1961, some watches and other jewelry were
stolen from a wholesale jewelry store in Philadelphia. The police were notified. During their investigation they requested people in that area to report
to detective headquarters any person seen with watches. Subsequently an
unidentified person called detective headquarters and reported that a man
with bushy grey hair, needing a shave, short in stature, Italian in appearance,
and attired in tweed pants and a striped shirt was trying to sell watches in
a taproom near the burglarized store. Detectives immediately went to the
named taproom but did not see the man described. Bosurgi, who answered
the description, was found in a nearby bar. Bosurgi was directed to stand up;
the detectives "patted him down" and found several watches later identified
as part of the stock taken from the burglarized store. At detective headquarters, Bosurgi was ordered to remove his trousers which were vacuumed
revealing glass particles that might have come from the broken plate glass
25
window of the jewelry store.
The court addressed itself to the question of whether that search was
unreasonable. Preliminarily, the court said "a study of Mapp would indicate
that, at least by implication, state courts are still free to apply their own,
rather than the federal, criteria of 'reasonableness.' "26 The remainder of
this Recent Case will consider whether the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's
criteria for "reasonableness" (as illustrated in the Bosurgi case and the
Cockfield case) does differ from the federal standard and whether the criteria
given will sufficiently guide the lower courts and the police.
Under federal and Pennsylvania law a search incidental to a lawful arrest, even performed without a warrant, may not constitute unreasonable
search and seizure.27 An arrest may be lawful without a warrant when an
21.
22.
23.
24.

2 PENNSYLVANIA LAW ENCYCLOPEDIA, Appeals § 21 (1957).
Sup-.; note 19.
Supra note 9.
This right is not accorded to the accused since he may take an appeal from

the trial. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8, at 64, 190 A.2d at 308-09.
25. Brief for Appellee, p. 2, Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8.
26. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8, at 65, 190 A.2d at 309. But see Ker v.

California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
27. E.g., Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959);

Draper v. United States,
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officer has "reasonable grounds" or "probable cause" for the arrest.28 " 'Probable cause' has been said to exist where the facts and circumstances within
. . . [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of which they had reasonably

trustworthy information are sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of
reasonable caution in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed
and that the person to be arrested has committed or is committing the offense. ' 29 The supreme court adopted this statement of the rule to determine if
the search in Bosurgi was unreasonable. As noted, this standard is similar
to the federal one, and the assertion that Pennsylvania may adopt a different
test is dictum. "In dealing with probable cause . . . we deal with probabilities.

These are not technical, they are factual and practical considerations of every
day life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.
'3 0
The standard of proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.
The facts which gave the arresting officers "probable cause" in Bosurgi were
his telephoned description and his presence near the burglarized store and
across from the taproom described in the call. The detectives did not see
Bosurgi attempt to sell any watches; they did not wait to observe any of his
actions; they arrested him on sight. In Cochran v. United States31 an unidentified informant told police that Cochran might be responsible for a holdup. The informant told the officers the approximate location of Cochran's
residence and said that he had a car of the type the officers were trying to
find. Detectives made the arrest of Cochran in his room. A search of the
room revealed a gun. Cochran moved to suppress this evidence. The court
held that the police did not have probable cause to make the arrest and therefore the seizure was illegal. Mere suspicion, said the court, is not enough to
justify an arrest. It would seem that the facts of the Cochran case and those
of the Bosurgi case are similar, and that the Cochran court would not have
found probable cause in the Bosurgi fact situation. Usually under the federal
standard there is something more than information from an anonymous in358 U.S. 307 (1959); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, rehearing denied, 338
U.S. 839 (1949) ; Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) ; United States v.
Murphy, 290 F.2d 573 (3d Cir. 1961) ; United States v. Law, 190 F. Supp. 100 (S.D.
Cal. 1960) ; Commonwealth v. Stubler, 84 Pa. Super. 32 (1924) ; Commonwealth v.
Finch, 80 Pa. Super. 386 (1923).
28. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1962); Draper v. United States,
358 U.S. 307 (1959); McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881); Wakely v. Hart, 6
Binn. 316 (Pa. 1814).
29. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8, at 67, 190 A.2d at 310. See Brinegar
v. United States, supra note 27; Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931);
McCarthy v. DeArmit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881). See generally MACHEN, LAW OF ARREST 48
(1950), I VARON, SEARCHES, SEIZURES AND IMMUNITIES 80 (1961) ; Note, 75 U. PA.
L. REV. 485 (1927).
30. Commonwealth v. Bosurgi, supra note 8, at 67, 190 A.2d at 310, quoting Brinegar v. United States, supra note 27, at 175.
31. 291 F.2d 633 (8th Cir. 1961).

RECENT CASES

1963]

formant needed to constitute probable cause: the fact that the informant is
known to be reliable,8 2 observance by police officers to substantiate their in84
formation, 88 or flight by the accosted when the police identify themselves.
In Bosurgi no attempt to corroborate the information was made before the
85
arrest; the arrest was made solely on the strength of the phone call. However, even when courts agree on the rule of law to apply to a probable cause
situation, they may disagree on the effect of its application to given facts.
Perhaps the assertion that Pennsylvania was free to adopt its own standard
of reasonableness was dictum; but it may be that Pennsylvania is only paying lip service to the federal standard, actually loosening the requirements for
probable cause and subtly promulgating a different standard for reasonableness. This case is not clear on the issue; one cannot be sure what the differences, if any, are between the federal view and the Pennsylvania view as to
what constitutes probable cause.
In Commonwealth v. Cockfield"6 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
again held a search reasonable under the "Homeric epithet," 87 incidental to a
lawful arrest. A Philadelphia fire claimed the lives of a mother and her two
children. Investigation at the burning building led detectives to suspect arson.
They discovered a strained relationship between the mother and her boy
friend, identified as one Cockfield. He had exhibited a pattern of violence
toward the deceased. On the strength of this information, a detective went
to Cockfield's home but was denied entrance. Learning that Cockfield was
the registered owner of a 1953 Dodge, a detective looked for and found his
car. After watching the car for three hours the detective searched it and
found a "two gallon Gulf, blue and orange gasoline can lying on its side"
with a "wet spot" smelling "like gasoline" underneath. He saw a roll of pale
green toilet tissue, charred around the edges. These articles were not removed, but the car was taken to a nearby precinct station where its distributor
cap was removed. 8 The car disappeared from in front of precinct head32. Draper v. United States, supra note 27.
33.

34.
Sun v.
35.
36.
37.
38.
Raifer:

United States v. Murphy, supra note 27.

Levine v. United States, 138 F.2d 627, 629 (2d Cir. 1943). But see Wong
United States, supra note 28.
Compare Costello v. United States, 298 F.2d 99 (9th Cir. 1962).
Supra note 9.
Brief for Appellant, p. 10, Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra note 9.
Id., p. 17a. The following is taken from the interrogation on direct of detective
After you saw these things, did you take them out of the car?
No, sir.
What did you do?
I closed the trunk.
Closed the trunk?
Yes.
Q. Then what did you do?

Q.
A.
Q.
A.
Q.
A.
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quarters that afternoon. 39 On April 8th Cockfield was taken into custody and
on April 9th he admitted to the police that he had thrown gasoline on the
burned house but denied that he ignited the gasoline. On April 10th Cockfield's car again was searched and the gasoline can and toilet tissue were
seized. Cockfield's counsel moved to suppress the introduction into evidence
of the gasoline can and toilet tissue. The Court of Quarter Sessions of
40
Philadelphia granted the motion, and the Commonwealth appealed.
The supreme court stated the general rule that "if an arrest is valid, a
search and seizure which are incidental to that arrest are valid." 41 In this case
the validity of the arrest was not questioned. The decision turned on whether
the search and seizure performed fifty-seven hours after the defendant was
taken into custody were incidental to the arrest. Cockfield was not arrested
in his car. Little danger existed in this situation of the car's removal before
a warrant could have been taken out. 42 The court said however,

"Incidental" in its pertinent meaning, refers to that which
follows as an "incident," i.e., "an event of accessory or subordinate
character" [The Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 5, p. 152]. In
our view, the search and seizure of the contents of Cockfield's
automobile were clearly "incidental" to the arrest and the one logically followed the other. The time which elapsed between the time
of the arrest and the time of the search does not destroy the character
of the search as incidental to the arrest.

. .

. [V]iewed under all the

circumstances presented on the instant record, the search and seizure
reasonable in nature and "incidental" to the valid
were clearly
43
arrest.
If this language means that the Pennsylvania test for incidental to an arrest
requires merely that one logically follow the other, it would seem that the
Cockfield court has added to the confusion by introducing a standard which has
no defined meaning in light of previous cases, and little or no basis in the
A. I think that policeman Merryweather got behind the wheel, and I pushed
the automobile from 57th and Spruce to 55th and Pine.
Q. Why (lid you do that?
A. I felt that was the way that I could get to reach Cockfield, that he would
come to get the automobile, and I could further my investigation as to what
happened at the fire premises.
Brief for Appellant, p. 37a, Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra note 9. It was not argued
that this conduct was unreasonable.
39. "Cockfield, in the meantime, found his automobile in front of the precinct
station, apparently was told the police did not want it, went out and bought the parts
necessary to start it and removed the automobile to the residence of one Curtis Wally,
Cockfield's friend." Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra note 9, at 71 n.1, 190 A.2d
at 900 n.1.
40. The right of the Commonwealth to appeal is discussed pp. 420-21 supra.
41. Commonwealth v. Cockfield, supra note 9, at 75, 190 A.2d at 901.
42. See Carroll v. United States, 354 U.S. 394 (1924).
43. Supra note 9, at 77, 190 A.2d at 901-02.
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historical development of the rule permitting searches incidental to a valid
arrest. Search incidental to arrest was recognized as an exception to the requirement for a search warrant under the common law since early times; this
exception was considered implicit under the fourth amendment by federal
and state courts. 44 Two reasons exist for the exception.
No matter how innocent the person may appear, there is always
a possibility that he is armed, and the officer is not required to run
the personal risk of holding a person in custody without finding
out by the only sure method-a thorough search. ... [F]requently
the accused will have on his person the very instrument with which
the crime was committed, such as the club used in the assault or
the knife used in the murder, or he may have the fruits of the
may be
crime, such as the stolen watch or counterfeit coin. This
45
seized in order to prevent the accused from destroying it.
The word "incidental" has always connoted a search immediately after arrest.
To include within the doctrine the search of an automobile many hours after
the accused had been arrested at another place would seem to pervert the
reason for the rule. Necessity is absent.
While the language of Cockfield suggests that Pennsylvania has a
different standard for reasonableness than the federal one, the holdings in
both Cockfield and Bosurgi may share the federal rationale if viewed in light
of the decision in United States v. Rabinowitz. 46 The respondent was convicted of selling, possessing, and concealing forged and altered obligations
of the United States with intent to defraud. In the words of Mr. Justice
Minton, "The question presented here is the reasonableness of a search without a search warrant of a place of business consisting of a one-room office,
incident to a valid arrest. '47 Government officers armed with a warrant went
to Rabinowitz's business office. Placing him under arrest, the officers conducted an extensive hour and one-half search of his office finally finding 573
stamps on which it was later determined that overprints had been forged.
The respondent made a timely motion to suppress that evidence. The place of
a valid arrest, held the court, may be included in the search "in order to
find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means
by which it was committed. ' 48
44. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; People
v. Chiagles, 237 N.Y. 193, 142 N.E. 583 (1923) (opinion by Cardozo, J.).
45. MACHEN, THE LAW OF SEARCH AND SEIZURE 62-63 (1950).
46. 339 U.S. 56 (1949). See Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959) ; Draper v.
United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927)
United States v. Kerchenblatt, 16 F.2d 202 (2d Cir. 1926) (opinion by Learned Hand)
Commonwealth v. Stubler, 84 Pa. Super. 32 (1924).
47. United States v. Rabinowitz, supra note 46, at 57. (Emphasis added.)
48. Id. at 61.
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Previously, in Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States"9 and United
States v. Lefkowitz 50 the Supreme Court was confronted with cases in which
government officers made valid arrests within a building and then violently
ransacked the premises in search of incriminating evidence. Even though
these searches passed the incidental test, they were condemned as "exploratory searches," violative of the fourth amendment. These decisions gave
rise to a further question in Rabinowitz: Was the search in this case of such
intensity and duration that it was violative of the fourth amendment ?5 1
Discussing this issue the Court made its oft-quoted statement,
What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any
fixed formula. The Constitution does not define what are unreasonable searches and, regrettably, in our discipline we have no ready
made litmus paper test. The recurring question of the reasonableness
of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of
52
each case.
Rabinowitz has been interpreted to mean that whether a search is incidental
to an arrest may be just one factor in the "total atmosphere of the case." 58
This view makes the federal standard uselessly vague. The case only holds
that even a search which is incidental, must be performed in a reasonable
54
manner, or fourth amendment rights are violated.
If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has adopted the broader rationale of
Rabinowitz in the Bosurgi and Cockfield decisions, one may view them as
ad hoc determinations of reasonableness and nothing more.5 5 This interpretation of the cases is suggested by their language. Fourth amendment rights
may be accorded the accused in this manner at the appellate level, but,
practically, ad hoc determinations furnish little guide for the lower courts
or the police. Countless unreasonable searches and seizures may take place
because the police have no concrete standard to restrain them in their daily
conduct. In these situations the innocent suffer because their cases rarely
reach the trial or appellate level.
Bosurgi and Cockfield have done little to clarify what is a reasonable
search and seizure in Pennsylvania. The ambiguous test of reasonableness
49. 282 U.S. 344 (1930).
50. 285 U.S. 452 (1932).
51. See MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 78.
52. Supra note 46, at 63.
53. Id. at 65-66. Note the language used in Commonwealth v. Scull, 200 Pa. Super.
122, 126, 128, 186 A.2d 854, 856, 857 (1962) ; Commonwealth v. Czazkowski, 198 Pa.
Super. 511, 514, 182 A.2d 298, 299 (1962) ; Commonwealth v. Richards, 198 Pa. Super.
39, 43, 182 A.2d 291, 293, 294 (1962).
54. MACHEN, op. cit. supra note 45, at 82. To get an idea of the aftermath of

Rabinowitz's ambiguity see Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961).

55. This argument was used by the Commonwealth in Commonwealth v. Bosurgi,
supra note 8. Brief for Appellee, p. 15.
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set out in Rabinowitz makes any comparison between the federal standard
and the Pennsylvania standard inconclusive. Mr. Justice Clark accurately
summed up the present state of search and seizure; it is a "quagmire" 56 and
the Pennsylvania courts have gotten their feet wet.
MERRILL

56. Chapman v. United States, supra note 54, at 622.

A.

YOHE, JR.

HOCHGERTEL v. CANADA DRY CORPORATION:
THE HAZARDS OF TENDING BAR
The plaintiff, a bartender in the performance of his calling, incurred personal injuries when an innocuous-looking bottle of soda water exploded behind
the bar. The defendant, who manufactured the malcontent bottle, sold and
delivered it directly to the plaintiff's employer. Plaintiff brought two actions;'
in this one2 he sought recovery on breach of warranty theories. The lower
court sustained preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer 3 and the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed. This Recent Case will evaluate
Hochgertel in the light of decisions of this and other jurisdictions. Pennsylvania's position on the various issues raised will be compared with other views;
the comparison will form the basis for conclusions about the decision.
The Hochgertel decision leaves the law on the privity of contract requirement for recovery on contract theories in a state of some confusion in
Pennsylvania. Federal courts currently make such guarded statements as
this: "it is now clear that privity of contract is not required in Pennsylvania,
certainly not in suits by purchasers of new automobiles against the manufacturer."'4 One wonders if the only safe approach now is to consider each of our
decisions on the privity issue restricted to its own facts.
To understand the implications of Hochgertel it is necessary to study a
long line of cases representing a trend toward abolishment of the privity
requirement in this state. In the beginning the rule was stated in this manner:
"Privity of contract is the relation that exists between two or more contracting
parties. It is essential to the maintenance of an action on any contract that
there should subsist a privity between the plaintiff and defendant, in respect
to the matter sued on."6 The leading case of Timberland Lumber Co. v. Climax
Mfg. Co. espoused this inflexible rule in dictum as late as 1932.0 But by then
decisional inroads had penetrated the doctrine, and an exception had developed in the case of food products. 7 A little over a decade after Timberland a
1. Plaintiff brought separate actions of assumpsit and trespass, authorized by the
supreme court in Cunningham v. Joseph Home Co., 406 Pa. 1, 176 A.2d 648 (1961).
2. Hochgertel v. Canada Dry Corp., 409 Pa. 610, 187 A.2d 575 (1963).
3. Id. at 612, 187 A.2d at 577.
4. Duckworth v. Ford Motor Co., 211 F. Supp. 888, 891 (D.Pa. 1962).
5. Hartley v. Phillips, 198 Pa. 9, 13 (1901).
6. 61 F.2d 391, 393 (3d Cir. 1932) (dictum). Although in 1 WILLISTON, SALES §
244 n.8a (rev. ed. 1948) the case is cited as upholding the privity requirement, it should
be kept in mind both that this was dictum and that the plaintiff conceded the point. See
Del Duca, Commercial Code Litigation: Conflicts of Law; Sales, 65 DIcx. L. REv. 283,
306 n.6 (1961); Note, Liability of Manufacturers and Wholesalers to Ultimate Consumers in Pennsylvania for Breach of Warranty, 31 TEMP. L.Q. 62, 64 (1957).

7. Nock v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 Atl. 537 (1931)
Catani v. Swift & Co., 251 Pa. 52, 95 Atl. 931 (1915).

428
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federal court voiced the precocious opinion that privity had been abolished
from Pennsylvania law. "The abolition of 'the requirement occurred first in
the food cases, next in the beverages decisions and now has been extended to
those cases in which the article manufactured, not dangerous or even beneficial if properly made, injured a person because it was manufactured improperly."'8 But Pennsylvania courts insisted on deciding for themselves what
Pennsylvania law was, and decisions indicating the contrary continued to be
handed down. For example, in Loch v. Confair9 recovery on breach of warranty theories was refused because the plaintiff was not party to a contract.
The facts of the case have much in common with those of Hochgertel: plaintiff
was injured by an exploding bottle before she bought it in a grocery store.
The court was not greatly impressed by plaintiff's argument that a contract
was not a necessary ingredient of an action in assumpsit, and declined warranty protection. 10 If the plaintiff had been a subpurchaser the warranties may
12
have been extended to her." But Kaczmarkiewicz v. J.A. Williams Co.
said they would not be extended to those not conventionally in privity except
for warranties which ran with food products. The employee of one who purchased a stepladder sought to recover from a remote vendor, on his employer's
contract. Even if the plaintiff acquired the rights of the employer, lack of
privity barred the claim, concluded the court. 1" Facciolo Paving and Construction Co. v. Road Machinery Inc.14 reached the same conclusion with respect
to the remote purchaser of defective 'road-grading machinery. However, it
was thought' 5 that broad statements made by the Pennsylvania Superior Court
in Jarnot v. Ford Motor Co. 16 might have the effect of overruling prior cases
requiring privity in this state. In Jarnot, the subpurchaser of a faulty and
dangerous truck was allowed to recover from the manufacturer. Shortly thereafter the famous Pritchardcase 17 added its weight to those not requiring privity, permitting the subpurchaser of cigarettes to go against the manufacturer
on breach-of-warranty theories. Thompson v. Reedman,'8 purporting to apply
8. Mannz v. Macwhyte Co., 155 F.2d 445, 450 (3d Cir. 1946) (dictum). Since
no breach of warranty was found the statements as to privity would appear to be dictum.
See Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403, 184 A.2d 250 (1962).
9. 361 Pa. 158, 63 A.2d 24 (1949).
10. Id. at 163, 63 A.2d at 26.
11. Ibid.
12. 13 Pa. D. & C.2d 14 (1957).
13. Id. at 16-17.
14. 8 Chest. Co. Rep. 375 (Pa. 1958).
15.

Del Duca, op. cit. supra note 6, at 307 n.98.

16. 191 Pa. Super. 422, 156 A.2d 568 (1959). The case was followed in Willman
v. American Motor Sales Co., 44 Erie Co.L.J. 51 (1961).
17. Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 295 F.2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
18. 199 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Pa. 1961).
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Pennsylvania law, extended the zone of protection considerably beyond that of
any of the prior cases. A guest passenger in an automobile recovered from the
remote manufacturer thereof on breach of warranty theories. The one ground
on which this case might be distinguished from Hochgertel is that here, clearly,
a dangerous instrumentality was involved-a bottle of soda water, on the
other hand, has an innocent appearance. Reedman was followed in Allen v.
Savage Arms Corp.19 The plaintiff was injured when a shotgun purchased
by his father blew up. In Allen the Uniform Commercial Code 20 overcame any
problem as to privity of the boy with his father on his father's contract of
sale.
At this stage of the developing trend away, down came the Hochgertel
decision, breathing new life into the dying requirement of privity. Vindicated
are the earlier lower court decisions holding that one may not recover on a
contract to which he is not a party. Cases apparently contrary to Hochgertel
are either erroneous or are exceptions to a general requirement of privity.
The supreme court expressly condones cases "involving food, beverages, and
like goods for human consumption," ' 2 1 which permit a subpurchaser to sue
directly. It is not possible to ascertain from the language of the opinion
whether the court considers a mishap owing to a bad bottle as falling under
the food-products exception to the general privity requirement. If one reads
the language of the opinion carefully, some doubt is cast on whether any implied warranty would cover the bottle itself. Since the court finds that the
warranty did not extend to this plaintiff it becomes unnecessary to answer
the question "Did the warranty cover the container as well as the contents
of the bottle ?-22 The question reserved by the court has earned Dean Prosser's
amused indignation:
There remains .

.

. an astonishing little argument over whether the

"warranty" of food includes the safety of the container in which it is

sold .

. .

. This metaphysical distinction between the container and

the contents can only be regarded as amazing. The two are sold by
each seller, and received by each ultimate purchaser, as an integrated
whole; and where the action is against the immediate seller (by one
in privity), it is well-settled that the warranty covers both. One can
only surmise that the courts which make the distinction have been
disturbed by an uneasy uncertainty as to whether, despite the evidence, the plaintiff may not have tried to open the bottle by banging
it on the radiator. Suppose that a bottle of Coca Cola explodes, and
cuts the plaintiff's wrist-is recovery really to turn on whether the
19. 52 Luz.Leg.Reg. 150 (1962).
20. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318A (1954).

21. Supra note 2, at 614, 187 A.2d at 578.
22.

Id. at 612, 187 A.2d at 577.
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explosion is due to a flaw in the glass or to an over-charged beverage ?23
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. 24 and other cases held that recovery does
depend on such a distinction. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stands a
good chance of replying to Prosser's question. When the plaintiff in one
of these broken bottle cases is a subpurchaser, he will argue that his case
falls under the food-products exception to the privity requirement. His
opponent will contend that in effect the case does not because the warranty
does not spread its protection over the container.
The cases not involving food products which are inconsistent with Hochgertel on the privity issue may involve other exceptions to the general requirement. Some of them may be explained away because they are concerned
with liability for the manufacture of dangerous instrumentalities such as automobiles and shotguns. The law of privity in warranty actions may undergo the
same development seen in tort actions, the development that culminated in
25
Macpherson v. Buick Motor Co.
Another factor which might explain apparently contrary cases is the presence of an express warranty made to the ultimate consumer by the manufacturer.2 6 A very strong policy dictates that the manufacturer should be made
liable to all groups within the distributive chain which are the target of commercial solicitation.2 7 Among the rules of law which the Jarnot court draws
upon in support of its decision is this: "a manufacturer who by means of
advertising extols his product, in the effort to persuade the public to buy,
may thereby incur liability to a purchaser notwithstanding privity between
the purchaser and the manufacturer is wholly lacking."' 28
When this entire body of case law is considered, the conclusion is inescapable that the privity requirement is a tool of policy, that and nothing more.
In accordance with "social justice" 29 the obligation of the manufacturer is
extended "as far as the relevant social policy requires." 30 A sure sign of
policy afoot is the number of fictions that play hide-and-go-seek with logic
23. Prosser, Assault Upon the Citadel, 69
omitted.)
24. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944).

YALE

25. 211 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916). See

L.J. 1099, 1138 (1960). (Footnotes

RESTATEMENT, TORTS

§ 395 (1938).

26. Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P.2d 409, aff'd per curiam on
rehearing, 15 P.2d 1118 (1932), aff'd on second appeal, 179 Wash. 123, 35 P.2d 1090
(1934) is the leading case on this point.
27. Note, Implied Warranty of Merchantability Renders Manufacturer Liable to
Buyer's Wife Despite Disclaimer Clause and Absence of Privity of Contract, 74 HARV. L.
REV. 630, 631 (1961).

28. Supra note 16, at 429-30, 156 A.2d at 572.

29. Supra note 2, at 615, 187 A.2d at 589; see Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in
Products Liability, 6 VILL. L. REV. 123, 155 (1960-61).
30. James, Products Liability, 34 TEXAS L. REV. 192, 193 (1955).
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in the products liability cases. 8' "[C]ourts ... invent a remarkable variety of
highly ingenious, and equally unconvincing, theories of fictitious agency,
third-party-beneficiary contract, and the like, to get around the lack of privity
between the plaintiff and the defendant." 32 Another favorite fiction employed
3
by the courts is one which visualizes a covenant running with the goods,
just as a covenant may run with the land. "If, as has been often said, the
warranty runs with the goods, then it can protect no one who does not acquire the title; and the employee34 . . . cannot recover. It may well be that we
are not yet ready, and may never be ready, to extend the strict liability to
such people; but if the time is to come when the courts are ready for it, they
have laid up trouble in heaven."' 35 Notwithstanding his observation Dean
Prosser apparently thought that such employees would be extended warranty
protection.36
The Hochgertel case concludes otherwise. The court stresses the fact that
this particular plaintiff was not a purchaser.
In no case in Pennsylvania has recovery against the manufacturer for
breach of warranty been extended beyond a purchaser in the distributive chain. In fact the inescapable conclusion ... is that no warranty
will be implied in favor of one who is not in the category of a purchaser ....
[T]he basis for recovery upon an implied warranty, absent a specific
statutory exception . . . must be that the implied warranty forms a
part of the consideration for the contract, and flows from manufac37
turer to subpurchaser through the conduit of a contractual chain.
The statutory exception the court refers to is that contained in section 2-318
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 38 Evidently it was argued that an employee
would fall under the extension of warranty protection afforded by that section. The provision reads as follows:
A seller's warranty whether express or implied extends to any natural person who is in the family or household of his buyer or who is
a guest in his home if it is reasonable to expect that such person may
31.

For an entertaining survey of the fictions that have developed, see Gilliam,

Judicial Legislation, Legal Fictions, and Products Liability: the Agency

Theory, 37

ORE. L. REV. 217 (1958). "This article is, in essence, an essay on the usefulness of
subterfuge." Id. at 219.
32. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1124.
33. Coca Cola Bottling Works v. Lyons, 145 Miss. 876, 111 So. 305 (1927).
34. Here Dean Prosser cites the case of Jax Beer Co. v. Schaeffer, 173 S.W.2d 285
(Tex. Civ. Ct. App. 1943).
35. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1133. (Footnotes omitted.)
36. Id. at 1142.
37. Supra note 2, at 615-16, 187 A.2d at 578-79.
38. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318 (1954).
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use, consume or be affected by the goods and who is injured in person by breach of the warranty. A seller may not exclude or limit the
9
operation of this section.A
Based on a reading of this section, the court concludes that "Clearly the
Code gives no basis for the extension of the existing warranty to an employee
of the purchaser. . . . An employee is in none of these categories. ' 40 The
court adopts a policy of strict construction, flatly refusing to "add to legislation,"' 4 1 despite the fact that it quotes comment 3 to section 2-318 which
says in part:
This section expressly includes as beneficiaries within its provisions
the family, household, and guests of the purchaser. Beyond this, the
section is neutral and is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law on whether the seller's warranties, given to his buyer
42
who resells, extend to other persons in the distributive chain.
One cannot help but feel that although the comment expressly provides that
section 2-318 is not intended to restrict the developing case law, the court
demonstrates reluctance to go beyond the enumerated classes to permit an
employee to recover on the employer's warranty.
Not all jurisdictions are in line with Hochgertel on this point. Leading
cases in other jurisdictions have adopted the view that an employee who is
not party to any contract of sale may recover on his employer's sales contract
for breach of warranty.43 In the Ohio case of Mahoney v. Shaker Square
Beverages,44 a servant was injured when a bottle of Black Horse ale exploded.
The court held that the bottle was a dangerous instrumentality, that the war39. "Since the Code does not deal with manufacturer's liability, its drafters apparently concluded upon an analysis of the interests that manufacturer's liability is
socially less necessary than the extension of dealer's liability to the buyer's family."

Implied Warranties, op. cit. supra note 27, at 631. The former has been referred to as
the vertical and the latter as the horizontal line of extension of liability. Del Duca,
Extension of Warranty Protection Under Section 2-318, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
CO-ORDINATOR ANNOTATED

419-21 (1963).

40. Supra note 2, at 612-13, 187 A.2d at 577. For the meanings of the terms
"family" and "household" the court in Hochgertel looks to the cases of Way Estate,
379 Pa. 421, 109 A.2d 164 (1954) and Shank Estate, 399 Pa. 656, 161 A.2d 47 (1960) ;
the former dealt with the construction of an alleged family agreement and the latter
with whether certain property was household property and therefore entitled to an
exemption.
This court had refused to pass on the question of whether an employee was included
within the class of persons to whom warranty protection was extended by § 2-318 in
Childs v. Austin Supply Co., 408 Pa. 403, 184 A.2d 250 (1962).
41. Id. at 614, 187 A.2d at 577. The court cites Altieri v. Allentown Retirement
Bd., 368 Pa. 176, 81 A.2d 884 (1951), in which a statutory construction act was cited
for the rule of strict construction of the statute there involved.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-318, comment 2 (1954).
43. See Annot., 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
44. 64 Ohio L. Abs. 200, 102 N.E.2d 281 (1951).
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ranty of merchantable quality was breached, and that an action could be
45
brought against the retailer. In the case of Petersen v. Lamb Rubber Co.,
an employee was injured when a grinding wheel bought by his employer disintegrated. He was allowed to recover on breach of warranty theories against
the manufacturer because the court found that his successive right to use the
wheel fulfilled the privity requirement. Perhaps both these cases require a
finding of dangerous instrumentality before the requirement is relaxed. 46 It
must be conceded that, notwithstanding the opinion of the court in the Mahoney case, some valid doubt as to whether a bottle is a dangerous instrumentality may well exist.
The -Connecticut Supreme Court construed an almost identical statute
the same way the Pennsylvania Supreme Court construed section 2-318. 47 A
college cook suffered personal injuries through the use of some soap purchased by her employer. The court refused to find that the cook was a member
of the household of the purchaser, and relied heavily on the fact that the legislature could have chosen much more suitable wording to extend warranty
protection to such persons had it wished to do so. One wonders if, because
of commonly accepted strict-construction principles, recovery will be more
limited in jurisdictions which have a limited statutory extension of protection.
That conventional kind of thinking may have been a factor moving the Hochgertel court to deny warranty protection to an employee.
Why is it important that the plaintiff is denied warranty relief since
there is always the possibility of a suit in negligence? One authority has
enumerated the following reasons: (1) plaintiffs often are a considerable
distance from production lines and therefore encounter difficulties of proof
(the effects of this disadvantage can be alleviated by application of the res
ipsa loquitur doctrine) ; (2) often the conduits in the merchandising chain
are wholly free of negligence so there is no cause of action against them; (3)
a shorter statute of limitations may be provided for the tort action. 48 Dean
Prosser, on the other hand, is of the view that limiting the plaintiff to his
remedy in tort occasions him little or no hardship.
[A]n honest estimate might very well be that there is not one case
in a hundred in which strict liability would result in recovery where
negligence does not....
or .
45.
135 Cal.
46.
tract in
47.
48.

.... [I]n every jurisdiction
. . its practical equivalent .

.
.

.. the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur,
. gives rise to a permissible infer-

5 Cal. Rptr. 863, 353 P.2d 575 (1960). But see Collum v. Pope & Talbot, Inc.,
App. 2d 653, 288 P.2d 75 (1955).
Note, Implied Warranties: Modification of the Requirement of Privity of ConCalifornia, 34 So. CAL. L. REV. 98, 99 (1960).
Duart v. Axton-Cross, 19 Conn. Supp. 188, 110 A.2d 647 (1954).
Del Duca, op. cit. supra note 39, at 416.
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ence of the defendant's negligence, which gets the plaintiff to the
jury. And in cases against manufacturers, once the cause of the harm
is laid at their doorstep, a jury verdict
for the defendant on the negli49
gence issue is virtually unknown.
Despite the strong view above advanced one cannot help but be a little uneasy
about the adequacy of the negligence remedy. Although that one is always
available, plaintiffs continue to battle for the remedy resting on breach of
warranty.
The Hochgertel case, though, is of the view that the plaintiff's remedy
in trespass is perfectly adequate, and points out 50 that the regulations as to
proof set out in Loch v. Confair51 will govern the subsequent disposition of
the case. Concerning the subject that court said,
Plaintiffs having testified to the manner in which the accident occurred, the burden should then rest upon the defendant A. & P. Company to show that after the bottle came into its possession it was not
subjected to any mishandling or to any unusual atmospheric or temperature changes. The duty would then devolve upon the Beverage
Company to establish that it conducted its operations with due care
and according to the usual
and proper methods generally employed
52
in the bottling industry.
This manner of applying the res ipsa loquitur doctrine has been criticized.
Primarily the criticism rests on the ground that there are too many causes
53
other than the defendant's negligence which could explain the mishap. It
has been said by experts that it is virtually impossible for a bottle to explode
without impact. 54 If this were accepted as true it would reduce the likelihood
of the manufacturer being responsible for the defect.
Some authorities are of the view that the courts even through the application of negligence principles are imposing something close to strict
liability in the exploding bottle situation. 55 The courts have justified their
doing so.
It is to the public interest to discourage the marketing of products
having defects that are a menace to the public. If such products
49. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 23, at 1114-15.
50. Supra note 2, at 616, 187 A.2d at 578.

51. 372 Pa. 212, 93 A.2d 451 (1953).

52. Id. at 217, 93 A.2d at 454. For a general consideration of the manner of applying res ipsa loquitur in these cases, see Fricke, op. cit. supra note 29, at 34.
53. Possible causes of exploding bottles include such occurrences as sudden changes
in temperature causing unequal expansion of different parts of the glass, overcharging
of gas, defectively manufactured bottles, inadequate system of inspection for defects,
excessive shaking on a hot day, and mishandling in transportation weakening the fabric
of the bottle. Id. at 29.
54. Id. at 30.
55. Id. at 28.
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nevertheless find their way into the market it is to the public interest
to place the responsibility for whatever injury they may cause upon
the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in the manufacture
of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market.5 0

Reduce the hazard and spread the risk5 7 are the arguments in support of
strict liability. Arguments can be advanced in support of the court's decision
in Hochgertel. Why should this individual have contract protection if he did
not pay for it? Why, in any event, does he need it, in view of the generous
application the Pennsylvania court gives res ipsa loquitur? But the law of the
future will undoubtedly impose strict liability on manufacturers of consumers'
goods. Perhaps the swiftest route to this destination is via the application of
warranty principles.
MELVIN DILDINE
56. Supra note 24, at 462, 150 P.2d at 440-41 (concurring opinion).
57. Dean Prosser feels that the risk-spreading argument is entitled to the most
respect. Prosser, op. cit. supra note 22, at 1120.

